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The plague epidemic that struck Saint-Louis in 1917 was the latest of a
series of epidemics that ravaged the city since 1867, and one significant
episode in the spread of the disease in Senegal between 1914 and 1945.
Both Francophone and Anglophone historians have contributed to our under-
standing of plague not only as a disease of the uneven distribution of resour-
ces and a disease of the poor “other”, but also as an ideological contest
between the colonizers and the colonized, and as a signifier of social meta-
phors. They have also underlined the ways in which plague helped frame
debates about colonial urban policies, especially the administration of the
urban poor. But, until recently, these studies have neglected Saint-Louis,
the first Capital of French West Africa (AOF), despite the violence that
accompanied the implementation of unprecedented antiplague measures and,
moreover, the role played by Saint-Louis as an experimental ground for
colonial policies later applied in West and Central Africa, and Madagascar
(Pulvenis 1968; Betts 1971; Swanson 1977; M’bokolo 1982; Curtin 1985;
Clément 1985; Goerg 1998; Echenberg 2002; Ngalamulume 2004).
This article attempts to fill the gap. It will explore the impact of the
plague epidemic on urban policy and race relations as well as the specific
ways that these issues were defined and resolved in the city.
1. The materials for this article were collected in 1994-1995 during fieldwork
research in Senegal and France assisted by grants from the Rockfeller Foundation
and from the Joint Committee of African Studies of the Social Science Research
Council and the American Council of Learned Societies with funds provided by
the Ford, Mellon and Rockefeller Foundations, and in 2001, 2002, and 2006 in
France assisted by grants from Bryn Mawr College. I thank them all for their
support. I gratefully acknowledge the comments made on earlier draft of this
article by Professors David Robinson, Gary MacDonogh, Jane Caplan, Madhavi
Kale, and Sharon Ullman. I also thank the members of the Bryn Mawr Commit-
tee on Appointments and the anonymous outside reviewers of my tenure dossier
as well as the anonymous readers of the Cahiers d’Études africaines for their
critical comments. Any shortcomings are mine.
Cahiers d’Études africaines, XLVI (3), 183, 2006, pp. 539-565.
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The outbreak of plague captivated the public imagination and mobilized
state resources in “sanitary defence of the colony” of Senegal in a way that
was only matched by the terror caused by yellow fever. Principles of out-
break surveillance were updated in order to deal with gaps in response
capacity. The legislative framework on which the authorities based their
combat against plague included two keys texts, that is to say, the decree
of 15 December 1909 and the ordinance of 12 December 1912. The first
decree, which replaced the decrees of 31 Mars 1897 and 20 July 1899
related to maritime sanitary police, was inspired by the 1903 Paris Interna-
tional Sanitary Convention which revised the sanitary measures used until
then in the light of recent discoveries concerning the prophylaxis of
transmissible diseases. The new decree extended the permanent sanitary
measures that applied until then to yellow fever, plague and cholera, to
include “other transmissible and importable serious diseases”. Local
authorities were required to rapidly notify by cable the Department in Paris
as well as neighbouring French and foreign colonies concerning confirmed
cases of cholera, plague or yellow fever and the precautionary measures
taken in order to combat the importation or spread of these diseases by
land or aboard ships. Each colony was required to equip at least its main
commercial port with the necessary sanitary infrastructure, including a laza-
retto for the isolation of clinically-suspected “pestilential diseases” cases, a
bacteriological laboratory, and disinfection machines, preferably the Clayton
brand which had the double advantage of disinfecting and destroying rats,
mosquitoes, and other insects found in the holds of ships arriving with
unclean bills of health. Moreover, sanitary authorities were strongly advi-
sed to balance the interests of public health with those of commerce2.
The ordinance of 12 December 1912 listed nineteen infectious diseases,
including yellow fever, cholera and plague that required compulsory notifi-
cation from physicians and paramedics to public authorities. The ordinance
had provisions for the official declaration of an epidemic in a given locality
(circonscription), the isolation of suspected cases in their homes or in
special wards, and the disinfection or destruction of suspected or contamina-
ted houses and objects. A special commission was required to determine
which houses were dangerous to public health and had to be destroyed and
which ones would be spared and restored. Negligence or deliberate sab-
otage was punished by fines or incarceration3. It should be emphasized
that, although not explicitly stated, the preoccupation with unsanitary houses
had major implications for urban colonial planning.
2. G. Trouillot, Rapport au président de la République (A. Fallières), 15 décembre
1909, Journal officiel du Sénégal, p. 70; Décret du 15 décembre 1909, Journal
officiel du Sénégal, pp. 70-79; G. Trouillot, Circulaire ministérielle relative à
l’application du décret du 15 décembre 1909 portant règlement sur la police
sanitaire maritime dans les colonies et pays de protectorat, 15 décembre 1909,
Journal officiel du Sénégal, pp. 138-139.
3. Arrêté concernant les mesures à prendre pour prévenir ou faire cesser les mala-
dies épidémiques, no. 293ter of 12 December 1912, Journal officiel du Sénégal,
pp. 37-41.
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Ecology of Bubonic Plague
Bubonic plague is a disease caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis that
is transmitted to humans through the bites of infected fleas, such as Pulex
irritans, that have fed on infected animals, such as “squirrels, marmots,
prairie dogs, mice, house cats, and, classically, the common domestic rat,
Rattus rattus” (Biddle 1996). Human plague occurs after infected fleas run
out of rodent hosts and start feeding on humans. There are three types of
plague: bubonic, pneumonic, and septicemic. Within six days of infection
60 percent of bubonic plague victims develop a bubo, or a grossly swollen
lymph node sometimes reaching the size of an egg or an orange in groin,
armpit or neck, accompanied by a high fever, headaches, muscle pain, and
mental disorientation; between 40 and 65 percent of infected humans suc-
cumb to the disease within a week after the appearance of the bubo. In
some instances, varying between 5 and 15 percent of the cases, when the
victim’s lungs are infected, the bubonic plague can be transformed into a
“primary” pneumonic plague, spread directly from person to person, and
kill 100 percent of those infected. In cases of either complication or untrea-
ted bubonic or pneumonic plague, the infectious agent spreads in the blood-
stream, leading to a septicemic plague. The majority of plague victims
were children, the elderly, and the economically disadvantaged (Carmichael
1993; Brossollet & Mollaret 1994: 14). The outbreak of plague seems to
be linked to the high-moisture weather that contributes to the multiplication
of rodents. The story of plague pandemics is well known and there is no
need to revisit it here. But suffice it to mention that the 1917 epidemic
was part of the third and last plague pandemic that started in China in
1894, struck Bombay in 1896 and reached the African continent through
international travel and trade; it ravaged cities such as Tamatave, Durban,
Cape Town, and Dakar (Echenberg 2002). Alexandre Yersin is credited
for having isolated the plague bacillus, uncovered the role of rats in the
transmission of bubonic plague, and the anti-plague serum, while Paul-Louis
Simond discovered the role of flea rats in the transmission of the bacillus
that was the missing link in Yersin’s work (Brossollet & Mollaret 1994:
84-97). The operations of deratization and disinfection of ships as well as
the building of entrepôts and sewers inaccessible to the rodents contributed
to reducing the spread of plague throughout the world. The treatment con-
sists of sulfamides and antibiotics.
Outbreak in Saint-Louis and Political Response.
September-December 1917
In early September 1917, there were rumours among the French residents
about cases of plague observed in Saint-Louis and the apparent spread of
the disease in the city’s slums. The medical authorities were disappointed
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that the epidemic preparedness undertaken in 1914 to protect the city against
the Dakar plague outbreak was ineffective4. Then, following the provisions
of the decree of 15 December 1909 and the ordinance of 12 December
1912, the authorities chose the Gardettes Building to house the eventual
patients, opened a lazaretto on Baba-Gueye Island for plague suspects, regu-
lated the movement of floating population, kept a watchful eye on the
overcrowded slums of Guet-Ndar, Ndar-Toute, and Sor, and unsanitary
dwellings, encouraged city residents to destroy rats by offering 0.25 cents
per captured rat, and offered the Haffkine vaccine on a voluntary basis5.
The circulation of rumours of an epidemic in the city three years later provo-
ked fear and panic among city residents even if the authorities had not yet
officially announced the outbreak of plague.
It was not until 7 December that the governor confirmed the existence
of clinical cases of plague in the city. The focus of infection was located
in Ndar-Toute and around Sidy Tall Mosque. The authorities took precau-
tionary measures to stop the spread of the disease in other parts of the city
and the rest of Senegal. The decision was a calculated move on the part
of the colonial officials, who had at their disposal panoply of urgent sanitary
and medical measures within the existing disease surveillance system, as
defined by the ordinance of 16 July 1903 related to the measures to be
adopted, in order to combat the spread of epidemic diseases6. As in previ-
ous epidemics, the authorities were hesitant to create panic that could disturb
commerce and paralyze the administration. But as the disease spread, the
colonial authorities decided to intervene.
According to the provisions of the ordinance of 7 December, city resid-
ents were required to notify the colonial authorities about new plague
cases. The ordinance gave the medical authorities powers to isolate the
sick for medical care, and put people who were in contact with the patient
and were considered plague suspects under medical surveillance in the laza-
retto at Pointe-aux-Chameaux for a period of 10 days; to destroy or disinfect
suspected dwellings, furniture, and other suspect objects; to inspect and
issue an unclean bill of health to any ship leaving Saint-Louis; and to pro-
hibit the importation of any product susceptible of transmitting the disease,
such as skins, used objects, bedclothes and rags that were believed to carry
4. Décret du 2 Septembre 1914 édictant des mesures exceptionnelles en vue de
prévenir et de combattre la propagation des maladies infectieuses; arrêté du
20 octobre 1914 promulguant en AOF le décret du 2 Septembre 1914 étendant
dans les colonies françaises les dispositions du décret du 14 Août 1914, Journal
Officiel de l’AOF, 1914, 924-5; décret du 28 Septembre 1916. See COLLOMB
et al. (1921). For an exhaustive list of sanitary measures, see COLLIGNON &
BECKER (1989).
5. ANS/Senegal/H30, Hygiene and Public Sanitation Colonial Committee meeting
records, May 20, 1914; ANS/Senegal/H30, governor to mayor, July 1914; ANS/
Senegal/H30, governor to Health Service, December 13, 1914.
6. ANS, Ordinance related to the measures to adopt in order to combat epidemic
diseases, no. 195 of July 16, 1903, Bulletin officiel du Sénégal, 1903, p. 401.
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infectious agents. Indigènes as well as foreign minorities (Moors, Syrians
and Moroccans) present in Saint-Louis were required to hold a health pass-
port or medical certificate issued by the sanitary authorities showing proofs
of a completed quarantine or vaccination. Travellers without this medical
document would be denied access to the train station7. Vaccination was
made available to city residents8. The declaration of an epidemic meant
that the colonial state would intervene into more and more aspects of peo-
ple’s lives. Physicians were authorized to make daily inspection visits in
the houses located within the infected perimeter in search of people present-
ing the symptoms of the disease. People would be told what to do and
where to go or not to go.
But three days later, on 10 December, the disease acquired a specific
social and spatial character, as the residents of Ndar-Toute and Guet-Ndar
became the targets of the anti-plague measures. Indeed, the governor impo-
sed a sanitary cordon on the two peri-urban villages, or slums, and restricted
the contacts between them as well as between them and the rest of the city;
targeted residents were prohibited to change residence without an official
authorization9. In order to prevent the clinical cases and people who had
been in contact with them from spreading the disease, residents were requi-
red to notify the municipal medical authorities of cases with suspected
plague symptoms as well as suspected plague-related deaths10. A three-
member commission was put in place to evaluate the cost of infected prop-
erty to be destroyed11.
Popular Protest
The urban poor found the health control measures described above arbitrary,
discriminatory and alien, given the fact that they violated their social norms
and cultural values. So the masses and their leaders were determined to
resist such discriminatory laws even if the indigenous healers had no cure
for plague (Echenberg 2002: 159-165). Resistance took various forms rang-
ing from violent protests to peaceful demonstrations and passive actions.
Some leaders of violent protests were often arrested and prosecuted. The
7. ANS/Sénégal/H49, Arrêté déclarant contaminée de peste la ville de Saint-Louis,
(quartier de N’Dar-Toute, Mosque Sidy Tall), 7 décembre 1917.
8. ANS/Sénégal/H76, Police de la ville de Saint-Louis, rapport du 22-24 décembre
1917.
9. ANS/Sénégal/H49, Arrêté interdisant aux habitants de Guet-Ndar et Ndar-Toute,
pendant toute la durée de l’épidémie, de changer de domicile sans autorisation
préalable de l’autorité sanitaire, 10 décembre 1917.
10. ANS/Sénégal/H49, Arrêté interdisant l’accès du quartier de Ndar-Toute conta-
miné de peste, 12 décembre 1917.
11. Arrêté nommant une commission chargée de procéder à l’évaluation des construc-
tions et objets divers dont la destruction aura été ordonnée par l’autorité sanitaire,
11 décembre 1917.
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most popular form of peaceful protest was the refusal by the women of
Guet-Ndar to sell fish on the market12. The first protests started in Decem-
ber when physicians Lailheurgue and Le Gallen visited a plague suspect,
daughter of Amadou Moctar, in Ndar-Toute and were told that she went to
the city-island. At the same time, women of Ndar-Toute took to the street
to express their anger against the specific restrictions imposed upon them,
and verbally abused the two doctors, as they were leaving the premises,
prompting the resignation of Dr. Lailheurgue13. The next day, health offici-
als extended the vaccination that started on 7 December to the rest of the
city and replaced the sanitary passports with vaccination cards. The same
day, François Carpot, the métis deputy and lawyer, conveyed the grievances
of the people of Ndar-Toute to interim secrétaire général Muller concerning
the harshness of the anti-plague measures and the unfair compensation for
destroyed property14.
The administration officials believed that, although the sanitary and
medical measures adopted were not sufficiently “energetic”, their strict
application would have contained the epidemic. But most provisions of
the early anti-plague measures never received the beginning of execution,
especially in Guet-Ndar that was considered “the main focus of infection”
because of a number of factors, chief among them the resistance of the
people of Guet-Ndar and the loopholes in the legislation that made the pros-
ecution of protestors difficult15. In the meantime, the ravages of the epi-
demic continued to spread and, by the end of 1917, plague mortality was
estimated at 58 deaths.
Resistance resumed in mid-January when the first two deaths in Guet-
Ndar were followed by the evacuation of only two individuals to the laza-
retto, the other plague suspects refusing to be isolated. In a telegram dated
16 January 1918 to the governor who was in an inspection tour at Bakel
in Upper Senegal, interim secrétaire général Muller reported that the entire
population of Guet-Ndar had exhibited a “grave attitude of character”, threa-
tened the Europeans, and resisted all attempts to remove the corpses of
plague victims and to evacuate the suspects, thus forcing the Hygiene Ser-
vice to suspend its activities in that peri-urban village. He also mentioned
another serious incident that took place in the northern quartier of Saint-
Louis where two European gendarmes—Bouville and Perennsez—and sev-
eral European and African health workers were beaten up as they tried to
12. ANS/Senegal/H76, Police report, 15-16 February, 14-15 March 1918.
13. ANS/Sénégal/H76, Rapport de l’inspecteur de Police, Albertini, 23 décembre
1917; ANS/Senegal/H76, telegram of Governor General Angulvant to governor,
March 16, 1918.
14. ANS/Sénégal/H76, Note de service de Muller au gouverneur, 24 décembre 1917.
15. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 29-30. The penalties for non-compliance with sanitary and
medical measures were either too severe (ordinance of December 12, 1912) or
too lenient, weak and inoperative (decree of April 14, 1904 related to the protec-
tion of public health in French West Africa) to be imposed by the courts.
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remove the body of Bouna, an interpreter of the tribunal who had passed
away the night before. He described the situation as a “worrisome efferves-
cence”, requiring the use of armed force, and urged the governor to return
to Saint-Louis where plague cases were in a “marked recrudescence”, as
the first European plague case was reported and sent to the lazaretto16.
The colonial authorities’ anxiety was justified in the light of the publication
of the fatality case for the first two weeks of January which indicated a
total of 22 new plague cases and 14 deaths. Ndar Toute had the highest
number of cases (15 cases with 11 deaths), followed by Saint-Louis (4 cases)
and Guet-Ndar (3 cases with 3 deaths)17. But the people of Guet-Ndar had
their own perspective on the causes of the tension. In a letter to the gov-
ernor dated January 18, 1918 they made it clear that they did not reject the
medical advice; “what we disdain”, they argued, “is to see our dead taken
away by the hygiene service when we can ourselves bury them as well [...]
according to the requirements of our religion”18. The response of the local
population shows that health officials were culturally insensitive.
It should be emphasized that the colonial authorities came to construct
resistance as a “Wolof resistance”, while the Bambaras (Bamana) were des-
cribed as “docile”, accepting to be evacuated to the lazaretto “without any
resistance.” Such a perception led Dr. Le Gallen of Hygiene Service to
wonder whether the colonial authorities could redefine the “native problem”
in Senegal in terms of “races” instead of religions (Islam vs. “animism”),
as both Wolof and Bamana were Muslims and yet responded differently to
the European demands, and to question the relevance of the usual colonial
categories (Europeans, assimilés, and indigènes)19. Moreover, the resis-
tance of Guet-Ndar residents was seen as a contagious disease capable of
spreading and infecting (healthy) people in other parts of the city20. But
the evidence suggests that violent incidents were first signalled in Ndar-
Toute and Saint-Louis, at the time when the situation was still calm in
Guet-Ndar. In addition, there were instances when the Bamana resisted
the evacuation to the lazaretto21. Clearly, Dr. Le Gallen’s assertions were
based on incomplete information.
A serious incident took place at the occasion of the death, on 22 January
1918, of Coumba Diaw, a woman of Guet-Ndar who had shown symptoms
of bubonic plague. Once notified of the death, Dr. Damian, Head of the
16. ANS/Senegal/H76, Official telegram of interim Secrétaire Général Muller to
lieutenant-governor Bakel-Maka-Colybentan, no. 409 of January 16, 1918.
17. ANS/Senegal/H76, Inspection of Sanitary Services to governor general, January
19, 1918.
18. ANS/Senegal/H76, “Habitants of Guet-Ndar” to governor, January 18, 1918.
19. ANS/Senegal/H76, Police report, January 22-23, 1918; also ANS/Senegal/H76,
Dr. Le Gallen to Head of Medical Service, January 22, 1918.
20. ANS/Senegal/H76, telegram of governor to governor general, no. C44 of January
17, 1918.
21. ANS/Senegal/H76, Police Report, 1-2 March 1918.
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Health Service, invited Inspector Mailleraud and two other municipal doc-
tors to visit the Lodo quartier in Guet-Ndar in order to provide marabout
Aldia Gueye with specific instructions for avoiding infection during the
burial ritual, especially the ritual washing of the corpse, and to isolate in
lazaretto the suspected cases, that is, those who had been in contact with
the victim. This first encounter between the medical authorities and the
residents of Guet-Ndar revealed a great deal of the mutual suspicion that
existed between the mostly fishermen and the colonial officials as a result
of past experience. Indeed, the medical team noticed that the 7,000 resid-
ents of Guet-Ndar were expecting their visit and were prepared to resist the
sanitary and medical measures taken by the state officials. Nobody wanted
to provide the medical team with the vital information they needed, especially
the identification of suspected cases to be isolated. Plague patients fled
their huts. The “mob” started to gather around the medical team and Faly
Sene, a local notable, shouted that “tous refusent de se laisser évacuer et
(que) personne ne bougera” (“everyone refuses to be evacuated and [that]
nobody will budge”). As the tension rose, health officers left the quartier.
The “mob attack” on them ended only when they reached the Servatius
Street at the entrance to the quartier22. So the medical team left Guet-
Ndar without seeing Coumba Diaw’s body or granting the permission to
bury her, or applying other precautionary measures, such as the isolation
of the suspected cases, the burning or disinfection of her home with sulfuric
acid, formolisation and cresylage, and the deratization.
Alternative Strategies: Moderates vs. Hardliners
This first encounter between the medical authorities and the urban poor
only reinforced state assumptions about its Civilizing Mission, which were
translated into plague policy, and about the “backwardness” of the urban
poor. But there was a division within the administration between hardliners
(medical authorities) and moderates (public officials) concerning the attitude
to adopt vis-à-vis the popular protest to sanitary and medical measures in
the early phase of the plague epidemic. The medical authorities, who had
observed signs of popular violence in Guet-Ndar, argued in favour of a “law
and order” approach, that is, the “strict application” of the provisions of
the ordinance no. 2093 of December 12, 1912 related to the compulsory
declaration of epidemic diseases, which were being implemented and which
contained provisions that violated the privacy of people’s homes. Physici-
ans wanted the administration to suppress the protest and establish the “rule
of law.” Public officials (governor, governor general, administrators), in
contrast, seemed to prefer accommodation to conflict. Governor Lévecque
22. ANS/Senegal/H49, Chief Medical Officer to Lieutenant-Governor of Senegal,
January 24, 1918, no. 31 ss.
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contended that the reaction of the people of Guet-Ndar to sanitary and medi-
cal measures could be understood as a reflection of their “ignorance” and
in the context of the Islamic religion. He suggested an approach that would
convince the moderate marabouts, such as Marseck from Ndar quartier in
Guet Ndar, Aldia Gueye from Lodo quartier in Guet-Ndar, Amadou Sarr
and Diaye Sarr Elimane from the mosque, as well as the cadis (judges at
Muslim tribunals), who were the natural leaders of the Guet-Ndarians, about
the compatibility of the sanitary measures with the prescriptions of the
Koran23. Some of the contentious issues concerned the widespread ritual
burial, especially the washing of the corpses, the burial ceremony and the
mourning practices, which attracted crowds and contributed to the spread
of infectious agents. It was clear that Lévecque was not prepared to follow
the “strict application of the indispensable sanitary measures” as health offi-
cials had hoped. Initially, the views of colonial officials seemed to prevail.
Carrera’s Intervention
Governor Lévecque solicited the intervention of members of the leading
families in Saint-Louis who had immense prestige among the lower classes
and spoke Wolof. He persuaded Carrera, Administrator of Colonies, to act
as mediator between the colonial state officials and the mostly fishermen
from Guet-Ndar. Carrera accompanied Dr. Damian, Chief Medical Officer,
and Dr. Dupont and his staff at the municipal Hygiene Service, to Guet-
Ndar on January 27, 1918 in order to convince the local notables to comply
with the anti-plague measures related to the isolation of plague suspects,
the disinfection or burning down of infected dwellings, the ritual washing
of the corpses, and other burial rituals, and the request for burial permits.
But the delegation from the city-island failed to convince the notables from
Guet-Ndar to comply with the plague policy as defined by state officials.
The local notables simply wanted “to be left alone with a disease that they
accepted with the fatalism characteristic of the Muslim religion”. At the
end of January, 12 cases with 12 deaths were reported in Guet-Ndar. As
of 9 February, 9 cases with 9 deaths were also reported. Doctors expressed
the fear that, given the fatality rate of 100% observed until then, the swarm-
ing of the fleas in the next couple of months could transform the already
overcrowded peri-urban village into a dangerous “focus of infection24”.
More mediation was needed.
23. ANS/Senegal/H49, handwritten note, n.d., n.a. provided.
24. ANS/Senegal/H49, Dr. Damian to Inspector of Sanitary and Health Services,
no. 58 ss. of February 11, 1918.
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Blaise Diagne’s Intervention
In the last attempt to avoid the use of force, colonial officials sought and
obtained the intervention of the Commissaire de la République, Mr. Blaise
Diagne, the first black to be elected député to French Parliament in 1914.
On 21 February 1918, Diagne sent a telegram to the mayor of Saint-Louis
urging him to get involved in the resolution of the medical crisis. He wrote
the following:
“I appeal to your high conscience in order to attract the attention of our compatriots
from Guet-Ndar on the imperious and urgent necessity for them to accept all the
administrative measures that were taken or would be decided in order to wipe out
the plague stop. Nobody would accept that because of lack of raison our compatri-
ots would contribute to the spread of the epidemic disease which would ravage
Saint-Louis as well as the entire colony and perhaps the entire FWA stop.
At the time when military concentrations will take place following the recruitment
of natives any hesitation in the preservation of public health will be tolerated no
matter the cost. stop.
I would thus be very grateful if you would apply an energetic and last pressure on
Guet-Ndar by gathering the local notables of the village along with the leading
residents of Saint-Louis in order to make them understand and accept all the meas-
ures that the administration has adopted and will adopt. The deadly character of
the disease requires these measures that, however painful they may be, remain com-
patible with the principles of the Islamic religion stop. If I enfant du pays exhort
my compatriots to submit to the rigors of the situation it is because only there lies
the preservation of all the population”25.
The fact that the colonial officials bypassed the mayor in dealing with
the Guet-Ndarians strongly indicates the existence of some form of tension
between the municipal authorities and the colonial authorities. Indeed, dur-
ing previous epidemics the administration officials blamed the successive
mayors for the filthy state of the city and the peri-urban villages. An appeal
to other members of the African elite must be understood in this context.
Diagne’s argument was not different from the “culture of poverty” explana-
tions promoted by the administration, which viewed the Africans as ignorant
and irrational. He did not take into account the urban poor’s grievances.
This is the reason why his intervention through the first elected black
Mayor, Pierre Chimere (1916), had little chance of success.
In the meantime, the administration expanded the methods of inspection
beyond simple police surveillance by sending troops to enforce the sanitary
cordon around Saint-Louis, Ndar-Toute and Guet-Ndar in order to arrest
the sanitary cordon violators by land and by river26. The authorities also
imposed a quarantine of 10 days in the lazaretto on city residents planning
to travel out of Saint-Louis while holding a medical passport. To obtain
25. ANS/Senegal/H49, telegram of Commissaire de la République, Diagne, to Mayor
of Saint-Louis, February 21, 1918, no. 10.
26. ANS/AOF/3G3-7/38, Requisition, by Lévecque, February 28, 1918.
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this document, the indigènes, Syrians and Moroccans were required to first
show proof of vaccination. In any case, they were not allowed to take the
train between Saint-Louis and Louga to Dakar27. Fishermen were allowed
to fish and sell fish under certain strict conditions in order to ensure the
continued food supply to the city, all transactions taking place along the
metallic fence. A pass from the Hygiene Service was required to cross the
sanitary cordon. A burial procession in Guet-Ndar was reduced to a maxi-
mum of 10 people and had to be escorted by two soldiers. A military
escort was also required for the maximum of three indigènes authorized to
go to the city hall to request birth or death certificates for a relative, and
for those invited to appear at the city hall, the police or gendarmerie28.
Governor General Angoulvant endorsed the comprehensive policy sug-
gested by Governor Lévecque. He encouraged him to enforce the sanitary
cordon, and find a peaceful solution to the crisis29, but without letting the
rebellion against the police and hygiene service agents go unpunished.
Given that all means of persuasion used by the administration, including
Blaise Diagne’s intervention, had failed, Angoulvant urged Lévecque to
enforce the existing laws while avoiding a bloodbath30.
From Accommodation to “Assault on the Body”
The Colonial Hygiene Committee
By March the medical authorities made a last attempt to convince the colo-
nial officials to abandon their accommodationist approach in favour of the
use of force. The members of the Colonial Hygiene Committee, including
five physicians, one veterinarian and five other members31, held an urgent
meeting on 21 March 1918 in order to consider the strategies to deal with
the health crisis. They unanimously agreed that “the free penetration of
the Hygiene Service in Guet-Ndar to conduct their operations must be made
possible by any means necessary, including the use of an armed force and
no matter the consequences that would result from it”; and that all the Guet-
Ndar residents had to be classified, en masse, as plague suspects to be
detained and evacuated in successive groups to isolation camps to be erected
27. Arrêté édictant des mesures sanitaires pour la ville de Saint-Louis, pendant la
durée de l’épidémie de peste, February 28, 1918, Journal officiel du Sénégal,
February 1918.
28. ANS/AOF/H49, Cordon sanitaire. Consignes pour les Chefs de poste, March 2,
1918.
29. ANS/Senegal/H49, governor to governor general, March 15, 1918.
30. ANS/Senegal/H76, Angoulvant’s telegram to Lévecque, March 16, 1918.
31. The Hygiene Colonial Committee included Dr. Contaut (Head of Health Service),
Dr. Fulconis (Colonial Ambulance), Dr. Basque (Colonial Ambulance), Dr. Dupont
(municipal Hygiene Service Head), Mayor Chimère, public works director
Grimaux, veterinarian Teppaz, and three notable residents (Douan, Cales, and
Marsan).
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in Sor and on Langue de Barbarie south of the Pointe-aux-Chameaux laza-
retto for a period of 10 days32. Mayor Pierre Chimère attended the meeting
but did not question the harshness of the plague measures for reasons diffic-
ult to explain without additional evidence. Taken in a context dominated
by the psychology of terror, this plague policy was not without risks for the
administration. The committee’s members did not even consider alternative
solutions, such as face-to-face communication with the notables of Guet-
Ndar, nor did they calculate the financial as well as the political cost its
implementation would require. In their view the city’s health had to be
protected by any means necessary33.
In his report to the lieutenant-governor the following day, Dr. Contaut,
who had replaced Dr. Damian as Chief Medical Officer, argued that the
use of force was the best strategy to combat what he then perceived as an
epidemiological shift from bubonic to pneumonic plague, which he believed
was dangerously spreading from human to human from its “irreducible cen-
ter” in Guet-Ndar. He provided the details of the new plague policy adop-
ted by the committee members, that included the evacuation and detention,
over a period of several months, of the entire population of Guet-Ndar in
the isolation camps for a period of ten days for each group, the burning
down of the infected huts that formed the majority of the dwellings, the
disinfection of the few suspected houses built in durable materials, the relo-
cation of everyone to a temporary segregation camp for further medical
surveillance, and their final relocation preferably in several new peri-urban
villages to be created. The confinement of the urban poor to one temporary
location would provide the medical authorities with the opportunity to visit
plague suspects, record deaths, and control burial rituals by putting antisep-
tic substances in the coffin. Guet-Ndar would be cleaned up with fire, “the
only energetic and radical agent of sterilization”34. The same day, the
autopsy performed on the body of a battalion chief Petitjean revealed the
septicemic plague as the cause of his death35.
Dr. Contaut’s report reflected the widespread belief among French colo-
nial officials and others that the urban poor had brought the situation upon
themselves by putting themselves outside the common law; they were to
blame for the spread of plague because of their “ignorance, lack of disci-
pline, and undesirability”. Dr. Contaut went so far as to consider the urban
poor, especially the fishermen of Wolof origin living in Guet-Ndar, as “a
special race” with “a particular mentality”. He prepared the ground for a
justification of the special measures taken to combat the plague in the city.
32. ANS/Senegal/H49, minutes of the Colonial Hygiene Committee, March 21, 1918.
33. ANS/Senegal/H 49, Colonial Hygiene Committee meeting minutes, March 21,
1918.
34. ANS/Senegal/H49, Dr. Contaut to the Lieutenant-Governor of Senegal, no. 108
L.S. of March 22, 1918.
35. ANS/Senegal/H49, Autopsy report done by Dr. Fulconis, March 22, 1918.
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In his perspective the financial, social and political cost of the plague oper-
ation, including the complete suspension of civil liberties of citizens, would
be minimal in the short-term comparing with the long-term cost that the
suspicion of Senegal would create abroad if the epidemic was allowed to
spread further from its dangerous hotbed. The general interest prevailed
over individual liberties36.
Dr. Contaut did not solely focus on the plague policy; he also laid down
the foundations of a new urban politique indigène, based on the fragmenta-
tion of the urban poor—who had acquired a kind of “class conscious-
ness”—as well as the fluctuating population (Moors, Bamana, etc.) into
several ethnic-based villages. The ultimate aim was to avoid in the future
“the negative mental disposition that has characterized Guet-Ndar until
now”37. Dr. Contaut’s reasoned argument, warning about the consequences
for the colony of the implementation of an alternative strategy to combat
the epidemic, was aimed at creating doubts in the mind of the governor of
Senegal, Mr. Lévecque, in order to convince him to adopt the new proposed
plague policy. What was the governor’s response to Dr. Contaut’s report?
Governor Lévecque’s Dilemma
Governor Lévecque rejected the radical plague measures—such as opening
fire on the protestors, setting houses ablaze in Ndar-Toute and Guet-Ndar,
and resettling everyone somewhere else—, proposed by Dr. Contaut and
his colleagues, who dominated the Colonial Hygiene Committee, even if
they both shared the colonial state’s perceptions of the urban poor. Indeed,
in his long letter to the governor general of French West Africa dated
25 March 1918, Governor Lévecque described Guet-Ndar as “overcrowded”,
“with houses on top of each other”, and he characterized the response of
the Guet-Ndarians to sanitary and medical measures as a “net resistance”
compared to the “sporadic resistance” observed in other parts of the city.
Lévecque nevertheless made a conscious effort to try to understand the
reasons behind the Africans’ response to anti-plague measures. He attrib-
uted that resistance not only to the “indigenous customs, superstitions, and
religious beliefs and practices”, but also to the encouragement that the prote-
stors received from “unscrupulous individuals, for whom everything goes
when it comes to conserving, regaining or winning the confidence of the
voters one may need38”. Clearly, a conspiracy theory was being developed
36. ANS/Senegal/H49, Dr. Contaut to the Lieutenant-Governor of Senegal, no. 108
L.S. of March 22, 1918.
37. ANS/Senegal/H49, Dr. Contaut to the lieutenant-governor of Senegal, no. 108
L.S. of March 22, 1918.
38. ANS/Senegal/H49, Governor Lévecque to governor general of FWA, March 25,
1918.
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within some administration circles to make sense of the reactions of the
urban poor to sanitary measures.
Although Governor Lévecque and Dr. Contaut agreed on the causes of
the crisis, they differed, however, concerning the solutions to the problem.
From the governor’s perspective, the suggested anti-plague measures were
“radical”, “excessive” and risky. He was aware of the fact that many
among the European city residents disagreed with him, especially those
“who are surprised that fire is not yet set on the four corners of Guet-Ndar,
that no shots were fired at those people, that they were not thrown to the
sea [...]”39. He had an answer for his critics: “I have not burned down
Ndar-Toute where the epidemic disease tends to disappear; I have not yet
burned down Guet-Ndar because I had to consider the consequences of
that radical measure, and did not want to aggravate an already complicated
situation.”
Having set the records straits, Lévecque went on to present his alterna-
tive solution to the crisis. His views were more moderate and realistic,
taking into account the imperatives of justice, reason, the available financial
and human resources, especially the small size of the police available for the
plague operation, and people’s cultural and religious beliefs and practices.
Moreover, Governor Lévecque was well aware of the fact that the majority
of the urban poor living in Guet-Ndar was French citizens since 1848; he
did not want their civil liberties to be violated in the name of public health
and was prepared to oppose radical measures that would leave an embittered
population. His efforts were paying off. Some leading resistors had been
prosecuted for rebellion. Among them were Fergueye Gueye, Alioune
M’Boye, and Makhary Samb. Gueye was charged with assault (voies de
fait) but he was acquitted on 18 January for having acted without discern-
ment. M’Boye of the southern part of Saint-Louis opposed the evacuation
of people to the lazaretto; he was arrested and charged with rebellion and
menace to the police inspectors during the exercise of their functions; he
received a six-month jail sentence on 13 March. Samb was scheduled to
appear for arraignment on 28 March. Thus, Governor Lévecque hoped that
the combined effect of indictment and successful prosecution of some lead-
ing resistors as well as the pressure from the sanitary cordon around Guet-
Ndar, in addition to the one around Saint-Louis, would create weariness
and, eventually, would break down the protestors’ morale to the point of
surrendering to the police40.
The optimism of the colonial officials was justified in the light of the
encouraging signs coming from the leaders of the urban poor. In early
March, 33 moderate notables from Guet-Ndar communicated to the colonial
39. ANS/Senegal/H49, Governor Lévecque to governor general of FWA, March 25,
1918.
40. ANS/Senegal/H49, Governor Lévecque to governor general of FWA, March 25,
1918.
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officials their willingness to submit to the sanitary and medical measures
and revealed to them eleven names of the leading protestors against the
measures, including one former chief, Birahim Gaye41. The initiative
reflected a split within the Guet-Ndarian community itself between modera-
tes and radicals. There were reports of an increasing tension between the
residents of the two neighborhoods, one group preventing the other from
selling fish42. The leaders of the moderate faction also sought the interven-
tion of Francois Carpot, former député (1902-1914) and a member of one
of the most prestigious Creole families in Saint-Louis. On 7 March 1918,
28 “habitants de Guet Ndar” sent him a letter requesting his assistance in
convincing the colonial administration officials to lift the quarantine. They
underlined the social (and geographical) character of the plague policy
which discriminated against them simply because they were the most vulner-
able segment of the urban population. They argued that such treatment
was not appropriate in the light of the contribution they had made in the
framework of the war effort in terms of troops43.
In addition, Moctar Bouna, Chief of Guet-Ndar, made contacts with the
police chief to arrange a meeting with the municipal authorities in order to
discuss the conditions of the application of the plague measures. However,
the police denied him access to the mayor’s office because he was only in
favour of disinfecting the contaminated huts but opposed handing over the
corpses to the medical team as well as the isolation of plague suspects44.
Both sides missed the opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully because
Western prophylaxis was incompatible with the indigenous theories of con-
tagious disease and practices. Groups involved on both sides were unable
to effectively communicate cross-culturally.
Mortality, Fear, Protest, and the “Radical Solution”
The publication, on April 3, 1918, of a special report on case fatality for
March, confirmed the apprehensions of the medical authorities. There were
9 deaths reported on the city-island, 1 in Sor, 1 in Ndar-Toute, and 57 in
Guet-Ndar in the previous two weeks (15-31 March). Mortality in Guet-
Ndar was increasing compared with 48 deaths recorded at the beginning of
the month (1-14 March), including 43 deaths due to pneumonic plague.
The clean-up efforts had resulted in the capture of 852 common domestic
rats, Yersinia pestis carriers, during the same time period.
41. ANS/Senegal/H74, notables from Guet-Ndar to lieutenant-governor, March 1,
1918.
42. ANS/Senegal/H74, telegram of cabinet director, Muller, to governor in mission
in Ziguinchor, March 7, 1918.
43. ANS/Senegal/H74, “Habitants de Guet-Ndar” to Francois Carpot, March 7, 1918.
44. ANS/Senegal/H49, Police Report, March 26, 1918.
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The report showed that there was an improvement in the quartiers where
regular disease surveillance, disinfection and burning down of infected or
suspected dwellings and case notification took place and a high case fatality
in Guet-Ndar. In his construction of the epidemic, Dr. Contaut attributed
the high mortality in Guet-Ndar to “our inertia obligée vis-à-vis Guet-Ndar”
and called for “a plan of action against this refractory village” that consti-
tuted “a dangerous thorn on Saint-Louis’ side45”.
The same day, 3 April, Governor General Angoulvant sent a telegram
to Governor Lévecque in response to his letter dated 25 March. Angoulvant
also rejected the radical strategy proposed by Dr. Contaut and the other
members of the Colonial Hygiene Committee to combat the epidemic.
Administrative and financial considerations weighted heavily in his deci-
sion. He urged that the sanitary cordon around Guet-Ndar remain in
place, and that the governor initiates contacts with local moderate notables
in order to find if there were volunteers for 10-day quarantine at Pointe-
aux-Chameaux, and give indemnity to the people who would loose their
dwellings. He posited a linkage between compliance with vaccination
and re-vaccination and the lifting of the sanitary cordon46. The task
ahead was difficult given that at the same time there were reports that
12 Guet-Ndar residents, who had to appear before the instruction judge,
categorically refused to first submit to medical examination at the lazaretto47.
The next report, made public on 17 April and covering the previous two
weeks (1-15 April), gave 3 deaths in the Northern part and 3 deaths in the
Southern part of the city-island, 1 death in Sor, 4 deaths in Ndar-Toute,
and 43 deaths in Guet-Ndar. The report indicated a general improvement
in mortality compared with the previous report. The improvement was due
to two factors: a) the predominance of the bubonic and septicemic forms
of plague and the decline in cases of pneumonic plague, the most contagious
form of plague, b) and the migration of infected rats from Ndar-Toute to
Guet-Ndar and from Ndar-Toute to the city-island. The medical authorities
were able to establish Ndar-Toute as the point of departure of the epidemic
and to link the movement of the infected rats to the clinical cases and deaths
reported. From its basis in Ndar-Toute the disease spread with the move-
ment of rats as follows48:
45. ANS/Senegal/H49, Special Report on plague in Saint-Louis (15-31 March),
April 3, 1918.
46. ANS/Senegal/H49, Official telegram, Governor General Angoulvant to governor
of Senegal, no. 365 of April 3, 1918.
47. ANS/Senegal/H49, Police Report, n.d. mentioned.
48. ANS/Senegal/H49, Special Report on plague in Saint-Louis (1-15 April 1918),
by Dr. Contaut, April 17, 1918.
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE PLAGUE EPIDEMIC IN SAINT-LOUIS
(adaptation from La Géographie, nos. 4-5 (Nov.-Dec.), 1925, p. 424
Mage St. (January, February) (from N to S)
d
Ndar-Toute r Geole Bridge r City Place du Governement (February)
d
Bisson St. (end of March)
Ndar-Toute r Guet-Ndar (December, January)
Ndar-Toute r Sor (Dec.): visit by two people incubating the disease;
Guet-Ndar r Sor (Febr.): visit by infected people.
The medical authorities could reconstruct the evolution of the plague
epidemic with confidence. They explained the low mortality rate in Sor
in relation to its particular ecology characterized by the abundance of sand
that was an obstacle to the multiplication of rats.
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In the meantime the medical authorities continued with the operation of
deratization on the city-island and in Ndar-Toute. To expand the sanitary
law enforcement powers, the governor general requested the abrogation of
article 31 of the local ordinance dated 12 December 1912 and its replace-
ment with a new ordinance that would a) increase the size of the Hygiene
Commission of Saint-Louis to include the personnel already involved in
the execution of the sanitary measures, such as physicians, police officers,
gendarmerie brigade chief, etc., b) and toughen the penalties. From then
on, refusal to comply with sanitary legislation would result in 15 days in
jail and the payment of a penalty of 1,000 francs49. Angoulvant also moved
to resolve the issue of conflict of interest faced by the mayors of Dakar
and Saint-Louis, especially during the epidemic crises, by suggesting the
promulgation of a new decree, issued on 6 May 1918 that delegated all
prerogatives related to hygiene and public sanitation to an Administrateur
Délégué from the Hygiene Service who would represent the governor50.
By May the crisis in Guet-Ndar had deepened. The supporters of the
conspiracy theory, who saw a linkage between the popular protest in Guet-
Ndar and the covert actions of some “political personalities”, including
“those who previously occupied high elective offices”, hoped that Governor
General Angoulvant would take radical measures to deal with the “serious
incidents” reported in various quarters of the city as well as the continued
defiance campaign against the plague policy led by 8,000 Guet-Ndar resid-
ents. But the governor general continued to support the strategy of accom-
modation adopted by Governor Lévecque. In a letter to the president of
the Conseil Général dated 4 May 1918, Angoulvant argued that burning
Guet-Ndar would only be a partial solution, for the colonial state would
have to rebuild it, as the majority of its residents were French nationals.
He broached aside any attempt to establish similarities between Guet-Ndar
and Dakar in 1914, where a new quarter (Medina) was erected for the displa-
ced people. He would only accept a temporary sanitary segregation but
not the erection of several new permanent quarters to accommodate the
residents of Guet-Ndar. He was in favour of a balance between civil libert-
ies and health concerns, and of a new legal framework to deal effectively
with the protest51. There were also financial considerations, as the expenses
for plague operation doubled, passing from 25,531 francs in 1917 to 50,000
francs in 191852.
The publication, on 7 May 1918, of another special report on plague
mortality in Saint-Louis for the second half of April (16-30 April) revealed
49. ANS/Senegal/H49, governor general of FWA to lieutenant-governor of Senegal,
April 22, 1918; ANS/Senegal/H57/31, 31.
50. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 32.
51. ANS/Senegal/H49, governor general to president of General Council, May 4,
1918.
52. ANS/Senegal/H77, Extrait des délibérations de la Commission coloniale, Janvier
14, 1918.
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73 cases and 62 deaths, including 38 deaths in Guet-Ndar, 1 death in Ndar-
Toute, 3 in Saint-Louis North, 4 in South, 3 in Sor, 1 in Gandiole, and 13
in the lazaretto. The actual number of deaths in Guet-Ndar was higher
than the official statistics indicated, if one takes into account the clandestine
burials taking place inside the dwellings. The report also established that
the vaccination and re-vaccination of the population, the isolation of clinical
cases and suspects, the disinfection of homes, and the payment of incentives
for the destruction of rats had intensified. But the residents of Guet-Ndar
did not show signs of compliance with the sanitary and medical measures53,
even after the issuance, on 25 June 1918, of an ordinance making the anti-
plague vaccination and re-vaccination compulsory in Saint-Louis, Dakar and
the towns located along the railway between the two cities54. Given the
difficulties to import vaccine from France, the administration encouraged
Dr. Leger to produce vaccine in the laboratory in Dakar; the production
of vaccine went from 10,000 cm3 to 150,000 cm3 per month55. Vacci-
nation consisted of a double inoculation at 5 days of interval; and the re-
vaccination took place 5 months later. A certificate was issued as a proof
that the individual was vaccinated56. But more state intervention in peo-
ple’s lives led to more protests.
Protest continued through July into early August, while the leaders of
Guet-Ndar multiplied contacts with the colonial authorities in Saint-Louis
to reach a compromise but with little success. On 12 July, Lévecque sub-
mitted a plan for a progressive evacuation and disinfection of Guet-Ndar,
and the Général-commandant supérieur his military strategy57. On 1 August
1918, Governor General Angoulvant tried one more time to persuade Blaise
Diagne to travel to Saint-Louis to bring the people of Guet-Ndar to their
senses. The real problem, as the governor general understood it, had
nothing to do with the compensation for destroyed property, but their decla-
red intention to disobey the laws and not to cooperate with the colonial
authorities in various matters ranging from disease control, to garbage col-
lection and hygiene. He saw a direct correlation between the resistance of
the people of Guet-Ndar to sanitary and medical measures and the formation
of a permanent focus of infection, on the one hand, and the continued spread
of plague epidemic in the entire colony, on the other hand. He concluded
53. ANS/Senegal/H49, governor general of FWA to president of Conseil général,
May 4, 1918.
54. ANS/AOF/H56/117, Arrêté déterminant les mesures propres à enrayer l’épidémie
de peste constatée dans certaines régions du Sénégal, 25 juin, 1918; ANS/AOF/
H56/117-6, Arrêté no. 806 déclarant contaminées de peste la ville de Saint-Louis
et les escales de la voie ferrée Dakar-Saint-Louis, et en danger de contamination
la ville de Dakar, et déterminant les conditions dans lesquelles seront faites obli-
gatoirement la vaccination et la revaccination dans ces agglomérations urbaines
et suburbaines.
55. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 33.
56. ANS, Moniteur du Sénégal, 413.
57. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 34-5.
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his message by stating that only “the rule of law in its entire rigor” could
come to terms with such “stubbornness”58. Diagne’s second intervention
failed to convince the leaders of Guet-Ndar to comply with the anti-plague
measures.
The State of Emergency, 13 August-14 November 1918
The strategy of accommodation, referred to by the colonial officials as the
“political phase” of the plague policy, ended in early August 1918, when
the “mob” chased Mailleraud Frederic, an agent of the Hygiene Service on
duty in Guet-Ndar, shouting insults at him. Plague administrators came
to the realization that the accommodationist strategy adopted so far was
unworkable59. They gave way, and on 13 August 1918, they inaugurated
what they called the “medico-military phase” of the plague policy by declar-
ing the state of emergency on Guet-Ndar, Ndar-Toute and on the isolation
station of Pointe-aux-Chameaux. The hardliners were delighted. They
then had the opportunity to use the “purifying fire” to destroy Y. pestis, as
they had hoped since the beginning of the epidemic crisis. Dr. Thoulon,
Head of Health Service, claimed that “because of their incurable inertia, the
indigènes had irritated their opponents and exhausted their best friends”60.
It is interesting to note that not only the medical discourse borrowed
the military vocabulary, referring to the people from Guet-Ndar as “rebels”
(habitants réfractaires), but also the plague operation was to be conducted
like a military operation, using the military tactics and military personnel.
Prophylactic and sanitary measures were secondary. The plague operation
included the immobilization of the fishermen’s canoes to prevent escape,
the occupation of the targeted neighbourhoods, the progressive evacuation
of the people to the lazaretto for 10 days before being sent to two temporary
segregation villages in Sor and in the hinterland of Saint-Louis, the system-
atic disinfection of few houses that were built in durable materials, and the
burning down of the majority of suspected huts. The instructions given to
the plague administrators were strict and uncompromising:
“It [the operation] is not about shuffling, negotiating, sparing such hut, sparing such
notable, (hesitating) instead of burning down: weapons must speak—with cold steel,
for the Tirailleurs (infantry) will have only the butt and the bayonet, the Spahis
will only use their sword or the clog of their mount”61.
58. ANS/Senegal/H77, Angoulvant to Commissaire de la République, no. 59 of
August 1, 1918.
59. ANS/Senegal/H49, agent Mailleraud Frederic to Hygiene Service physician,
August 9, 1918.
60. ANS/Senegal/H49, Report on the evacuation of Guet-Ndar (14 August-14 Sep-
tember 1920), by Dr. Thoulon.
61. ANS/Senegal/H49, Dr. Thoulon.
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The operation started on 14 August 1918 at 4 p.m. after the fishermen
returned home, and was met with fierce resistance. Men, women and chil-
dren were all armed with sticks, clubs, iron bars, harpoons, knives, axes, and
swivels. Within three days, given the imposing military force deployed,
the resilient residents of Guet-Ndar gave up all opposition and decided to
negotiate. On 17 August, a letter addressed to Governor Lévecque by the
“habitants de Guet-Ndar” reached the desk of the secrétaire général. Writ-
ten in broken French, it is almost incomprehensible because of the form of
sentences, grammar and disjointed ideas which reflected the problems the
colonial administration faced in making the Africans French. A close read-
ing shows that the anonymous authors of the letter tried to present a counter-
argument to all the accusations made against them. They attributed various
incidents that had occurred to serious “misunderstandings” and “non-
comprehension”. They denied being “resistors” and reminded the governor
that they had a long tradition of cooperation with the colonial authorities
going back to the time of Governor Faidherbe in the 1850s and 1860s. The
main evidence presented as the most recent example of cooperation with the
administration was the military conscription during the First World War.
After setting the record straight, the letter’s authors complained about the
negative impact of the sanitary cordon on their fishing industry and about
the non-payment of allocations to the families of the soldiers sent to the
front lines. In conclusion, they reiterated their attachment to the patrie
(France) and to Guet-Ndar, the land of their ancestors, and promised to
cooperate with plague administrators in the hope that, after their stay in the
isolation camps, they would be permitted to resettle in Guet-Ndar and
resume their normal fishing activities62. The letter from the residents of
Guet-Ndar never reached the governor’s desk. It was discarded because
of its anonymous character and classified by the hardliners within the
administration sans suite63. Argument could be made that by early August
the colonial officials’ construction of the plague epidemic was deeply
influenced by the doctors who had lobbied all along for a “radical solution”
to the Guet-Ndar problem in order to achieve “the final extinction of this
dangerous focus” of infection64.
An orderly evacuation of the people of Guet-Ndar began on 18 August
1918. Groups of women, children, the elderly and the sick in convoys were
transported in canoes, while men, escorted by the Spahis (cavalry) walked
to the lazaretto at the Pointe-aux-Chameaux on the Langue de Barbarie, as
the following table indicates.
62. ANS/Senegal/H49, Residents of Guet-Ndar to lieutenant-governor of Senegal,
August 17, 1918.
63. ANS/Senegal/H49, cabinet’s minute, March 11, 1918.
64. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 35.
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EVACUATIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF GUET-NDAR (SAINT-LOUIS 1918)
Women; End ofDate Men Children TotalChildren Quarantine
8 August 54 583 — 637 29 August
1st Sept. — — — 459 —
11 — — — 128 —
15 — — — 377 —
16 — — — 397 27 Sept.
28 A76 — — 464 —
12 Oct. — — — 533 —
3 Nov. — — — 248 —
14 — — — — End of
emergency
Source: ANS/Senegal/H49, Report on the Evacuation of Guet-Ndar (14 August-14 Sep-
tember 1918), by Dr. Thoulon. a. ANS/AOF/H56/48, Commandant militaire to governor
general, September 29, 1918.
The dwellings at Pointe-aux-Chameaux could accommodate a total of
400 people at one time. The duration of the quarantine was 10 days. In
any case, by mid-September the leading protestors surrendered to the secur-
ity forces after receiving assurances that they would receive special wards
in the isolation camp. In early November Guet-Ndar was empty and ready
for the “purifying fire” which consumed all but 126 dwellings built in dur-
able materials65. The medico-military phase was then replaced by the
“medico-hygienic” phase of the plague policy. Governor General Angoul-
vant estimated the expenses engaged in the operation of evacuation of Guet-
Ndar and the destruction of homes at around 1 million francs66.
The very operation of the quarantine itself in the lazaretto presented the
administration with a logistical challenge that became a real nightmare.
Carrera, administrator of the plague policy in Saint-Louis, received many
complaints about the inadequacy of food and water supplies, transportation
of health officers, indiscipline of plague administration agents, inexperience
of canoeists, and delays in the payment of indemnity to the troops enforcing
the quarantine. Abdoulaye Wade, a local notable whose mother, niece, and
two sisters—one having three little children—were isolated at the lazaretto
at Pointe-aux-Chameaux, accused the administration officials of using a
double standard in their isolation practices by making exceptions and allow-
ing some city residents to be isolated in their own homes, while rejecting
his request to keep his relatives in his house that was disinfected. His
mother and one of his sisters died of plague in the lazaretto. From his
perspective, a terrible injustice was done to him and others67. Other com-
plaints came from people from out of town who simply found themselves
65. ANS/Sénégal/H73, État des baraques épargnées à Guet-Ndar, 1920.
66. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 32.
67. ANS/Senegal/H74, Abdulaye Wade to governor, December 6, 1917.
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in the wrong place at the wrong time and who wanted to go back to their
families68. The year 1918 saw a sharp increase in plague morbidity and
mortality, with 1,233 officially listed cases and 1,033 officially listed
deaths69. Upon the completion of the quarantine in the lazaretto, 36 alleged
leading resistors were arrested and detained. Later, 18 were released for
various reasons70.
By early January 1919, the plague operation in Saint-Louis had created
serious administrative problems. After a ten-day stay in the lazaretto,
people who had nowhere to go were settled in two segregation villages built
one in the southern part of Sor and the other in the hinterland of Saint-
Louis, with the capacity to accommodate 1,000 people71 out of 7,000
ex-residents of Guet-Ndar. Others became homeless. The reporter of the
newspaper La Tribune criticized the colonial authorities about the fate of
the people left homeless after the destruction of their homes72. Some notab-
les from Saint-Louis, whose relatives lived in Guet-Ndar, complained about
the social character of the plague policy because residents of the city-island
(the elite and the middle class) were accorded a special treatment; they were
isolated in their own homes, not in the isolation camps as it was the case
for the urban poor73. F. Devès, General Councillor, was appalled by the
difficult living conditions of the people who were left to fend for themselves
in the city streets, including over 2,000 people camping on the beach in
makeshift tents. He blamed the government for the prevalence of “complete
anarchy, brutality and illegality” during the post-quarantine period and
demanded explanations from the governor general about the crisis74.
After a period of vacillation and shuffling and under intense pressure
from local elite and Paris, the administration finally decided to find solutions
to the crisis. An Evaluation Commission was set up to propose the compen-
sation to the residents of Guet-Ndar for the loss due to the plague oper-
ation. In 1919 there was a substantial decline in plague mortality estimated
at 257 deaths. The most crucial issue related to the reoccupation of Guet-
Ndar remained under investigation until September 1919 when the authorities
agreed to rebuild Guet-Ndar according to a new master plan to be designed,
which would have provisions for large spaces and street alignment and give
priority to hygiene and waste removal75. The decision to rebuild Guet-
Ndar can be seen as reflecting the final triumph of the moderates within the
68. ANS/Senegal/H74, unclassified document.
69. ANS/AOF/H57/18.
70. ANS/AOF/H56/51, lieutenant-colonel Lafitte to Commandant supérieur des Trou-
pes, September 27, 1918.
71. ANS/AOF/H57/31, 33.
72. ANS/AOF/P165/90, governor general to governor, January 13, 1919 about the
rebuilding of Guet-Ndar. See also Tribune, no. 66, January 5, 1919, 1.
73. ANS/Senegal/H74, Abdoulaye Wade to governor, December 6, 1918.
74. ANS/AOF/3G3.7/202, F. Devès to governor general, February 23, 1919; ANS/
AOF/3G3.7/210, letter of March 5, 1919.
75. ANS/AOF/3G3.7/218, governor general to governor, no. 1196 of Septem-
ber 10, 1918.
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administration who opposed the suggestion made by the Hygiene Colonial
Committee to create several new ethnic peri-villages instead. In October
1920, the new mayor of Saint-Louis, N’Diaye Cledor Amadou, provided a
total amount of 5,000 francs for distribution among the most destitute people
of Guet-Ndar76. The Commission was presented with fantasist claims. El
Hadj Macaty Fall requested compensation for a building that never existed.
Others misrepresented the rent they paid before the burnings jumping from
40 frs. to 300 frs. per month. The estimated value of the building John
Beigh went from 200 to 1,000 frs. It was evident that everyone wanted
to take advantage of the victim compensation fund77. As far as mortality
for 1920 is concerned, the statistics indicate a total of 197 plague victims.
Thus, the cost of extinguishing plague in Saint-Louis, the capital of Senegal
and of protecting Dakar, capital of French West Africa, from a second
plague outbreak left an embittered population.
*
The 1917-1918 plague epidemic in Saint-Louis revealed continuity and
change in the French medical policy with reference to previous epidemics.
The French experience with yellow fever and cholera in Saint-Louis pre-
sented many similarities with the 1914 Dakar plague epidemic in that, as
Myron Echenberg (2002: 424) has suggested concerning Dakar, the French
medical policy was authoritarian and dismissive of African concerns. In
the nineteenth century, it was the members of the civil society who led the
battle for a balance between health concerns, commercial interests, and civil
liberties. What was different in 1917-1918 was that there was a division
within the French community between hardliners (physicians), who were in
favour of the forced removal policy, and moderates (governor and governor
general), who were willing to take into account financial considerations,
civil liberties and some aspects of African culture and religion that were
compatible with Western medical and sanitary measures. It took the admin-
istration several months of negotiations before opting for the forced evacu-
ation of the people of Guet-Ndar. Governor Lévecque never made the kinds
of concessions he made to the Africans in Dakar concerning the vaccination
card, the possibility to isolate plague suspects in their own neighbourhoods
for medical surveillance (ibid.: 186), or leaving the dead bodies with their
relatives for dignified burials; these were the contentious issues that provo-
ked popular resistance to sanitary and medical anti-plague measures. The
grave consequences of using armed force against people whom they had
76. ANS/Senegal/H78, Ordinance of mayor N’Diaye Cledor Amadou, October 25,
1920.
77. ANS/Senegal/H78, Ordinance of mayor of Saint-Louis, October 25, 1920.
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classified as unsanitary subjects led the colonial authorities to abandon the
“ethnic villages” project in favour of rebuilding Guet-Ndar. This change
of mind shows that accommodation became a viable policy choice contribut-
ing to political stability.
Bryn Mawr College, Pennsylvanie.
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ABSTRACT
In this article I will examine the impact of the plague epidemics that hit the urban
colonial society in Saint-Louis between 1917 and 1920. This research shows that
because the poor, who lived in appalling hygienic conditions, were the most affected,
the measures taken against the plague soon became discriminatory. The refusal by
the medical authorities to find a compromise between what was necessary to prevent
further contagion and the cultural and religious practices of the poor, especially
funeral rites, provoked anger amongst the poor and resulted in a disobedience cam-
paign which lasted several months. This crisis revealed a deep gap between the
medical authorities who advocated the use of force against the rebels on the one
side, and the political authorities on the other. Although well-know figures such as
Carrera and Blaise Diagne intervened with the inhabitants of the contaminated areas,
they failed to reconcile the two sides. The frightening idea of seeing the epidemics
reach the better-off classes pushed the authorities to declare a state of emergency,
force the recalcitrants to go to the lazaret, and set fire to the contaminated areas.
The evacuated remained homeless until the day when the decision was made to
rebuild Guet-Ndar.
RÉSUMÉ
Peste et violence à Saint-Louis-du-Sénégal, 1917-1920. — Dans cet article, nous
examinons l’impact de l’épidémie de peste sur la société coloniale urbaine à Saint-
Louis entre 1917 et 1920. L’étude montre que puisque les pauvres, qui vivaient dans
des conditions hygiéniques déplorables, étaient les plus touchés, les mesures prises
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contre la peste prirent très vite un caractère discriminatoire. Le refus des autorités
médicales de trouver un compromis entre les exigences de la prévention de la conta-
gion et les pratiques culturelles et religieuses des pauvres, concernant spécialement
les rites funéraires, provoqua la colère de ces derniers et une campagne de désobéis-
sance qui dura plusieurs mois. La crise révéla une profonde division entre les autorités
médicales, qui recommandaient l’utilisation de la force contre les « rebelles » d’un
côté, et les autorités politiques. Malgré l’intervention des personnalités, telles que
Carrera et Blaise Diagne, auprès des représentants des habitants des quartiers conta-
minés, les positions des uns et des autres n’avaient pu être réconciliées. La peur de
voir l’épidémie gagner les classes les plus aisées poussa les autorités à déclarer l’état
d’urgence, à forcer les récalcitrants à rejoindre le lazaret, et à incendier les quartiers
contaminés. Les évacués restèrent sans domiciles fixes jusqu’au jour où la décision
fut prise de reconstruire Guet-Ndar.
Keywords/Mots-clés: Senegal, beliefs, colonial hygiene, health practices, plague,
resistance/Sénégal, croyances, hygiène coloniale, pratiques de santé, peste, résistance.
